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Dogs, Domestication, and the Ego
Gary Shapiro

Fondly, for three bitches: Blacky, Amber, and Annie

In Zarathustra's "On the Vision and the Riddle," three animals-a spider, a
snake, and a dog-make significant appearances, as do three human or quasihuman figures-Zarathustra himself, the dwarf known as the Spirit of Gravity, and the shepherd who must bite off the head of the snake. Of these animals, it is the dog who receives the most extended attention. Here, in the
passage that along with "The Convalescent" (with its eagle and serpent) is
usually and rightly taken to be Nietzsche's most articulate and yet highly
veiled approach to explaining the teaching of eternal recurrence, the riddling vision involves animals. This is scarcely the only passage in Nietzsche
to deal with the figure of the dog, although it is the one in which the dog
has the most active role; frequently the name of the animal appears only in
figurative speech. Here, even if the entire passage is a figure for the meaning
of recurrence, the dog is as lively and noisy within the text as any of the
other protagonists. Unfolding the vision and the riddle, or perhaps at least
discovering what questions it asks, requires a confrontation with the figures
of the animals and that howling dog. The parallel passage in The Gay Science
(341) includes a demon rather than a dwarf and a spider spinning in the
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moonlight but no dog and no shepherd choked by a snake. Let us note,
before proceeding further, that of all these animals, it is only the dog who is
domesticated in the "real world." Eagles and serpents may speak in fairy tales
(or at the beginning of Genesis), but they are fundamentally without language, although we suspect that the style of a dog's whining and whimpering
and perhaps its howling may have something to do with its domestication.
The need for a more subtle exploration of the role of the animal in the presentation of the thought of recurrence emerges when we realize that nowhere
in Nietzsche's published writings is the teaching ever articulately affirmed by
a human voice; yet in the two chapters of Zarathustra just mentioned, its dramatic presentation is staged with diverse animals. 1 The discussion of recurrence in "On the Vision and the Riddle" reaches a turning point when the
Miirchen-like dwarf has just "murmured contemptuously 'All truth is
crooked; time itself is a circle.'" Zarathustra's reply to this reductionistic
oversimplification is to pose a series of questions with very little in the way
of affirmation, his last question being "must we not eternally return?" But he
tells his audience-the searchers, researchers, and guessers of riddles-that
with such questions his voice became increasingly soft, for he was afraid of
his own thoughts and the thoughts behind them.
It is with this cessation of the voice that
suddenly I heard a dog howl nearby. Had I ever heard a dog howl like this? My
thoughts raced back. Yes, when I was a child, in the most distant moment of childhood: then I heard a dog howl like this. And I saw him too, bristling, his head up,
trembling, in the stillest moonlight, when even dogs believe in ghosts-and I took
pity: for just then the full moon, silent as death, passed over the house; just then it
stood still, a round glow-still on the flat roof, as if on another's property-that
was why the dog was terrified, for dogs believe in thieves and ghosts. And when I
heard such howling again I took pity again.

On one level this records an experience of deja vu. Zarathustra sees and hears
a dog howling just as he did when he was a small child. It does not seem to
be an identical repetition of the same experience, for the dog of childhood
memory howled as the moon rose over a house; here there is no house and
the moon had already risen, for the spider was spinning its web in the moonshine (although since we are dealing with the comparison of a vision and an
early childhood memory recollected within that vision, we must be cautious
when speaking of identity and comparison). So far the dog is just a marker
of such an experience, an experience that might indicate the possibility of a

